【多元觀點】Jana S. Rošker, "Specific Features of Traditional Chinese Philosophy"

【多元觀點】

Specific Features of Traditional Chinese Philosophy*

JANA S. ROŠKER

Professor of Sinology, Head of the Department of Asian Studies at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana and Director of the Slovene National research program Asian Languages and Cultures.

Classical Chinese Worldview: Binary Ordered Holism and Immanent Notions

　Immanent notions, which are fundamentally defining Chinese philosophy, represent a necessary result of the Chinese holistic worldview. The majority of the prevailing traditional Chinese philosophical discourses does not include the idea of transcendence, in the sense of transcending from one into another - usually “higher”- sphere.

It is, therefore by no means surprising that one of the central ideas of traditional Chinese philosophy, namely the crucial concept of the Way (dao 道), is also immanent in its very nature. In its dual ontology that is rooted in a inseparable totality, it implies both the original universal principle, as well as the smallest micro-atoms of existence which are permanently creating all the infinitely changeable worlds of existence through their infinite combinations. Dao is thus the basic, original and abstract driving force of the cosmos, but, at the same time, it is also the most concrete, particular and individual “way” of each living being. Dao is the elementary origin of every existence, and simultaneously it is the incorporation of all particular phenomena.

In Chinese thought, “dao” implies both, the essence of the cosmos and each single person, as well as a moral substance that embraces humanness, rituality, loyalty and other related axiological substances.[1] (Liao 1994, 46)

　Here, we must expose the fact that it can in no way be understood as an absolute principle as can be found, for instance, in the theological idea of the Divine, or in the ancient Greek notion of substance. Immanent notions can not represent an embodiment of the Absolute, for their nature is always conditioned by all they seem to surpass. The concepts that are rooted in such immanent worldview are conditioned by a relativization of all existence, and therefore they seldom appear individually. In classical Chinese philosophy, such an underlying relativity of the world was expressed through the before mentioned binary categories, which were composed of binary polar opposites (anti-poles).

　This mutual, complementary interaction of both poles is a process, able to express all entities in time and space, no matter how complex. However, before treating this aspect more in detail, let us first examine their abstract basis, as reflected in the traditional Chinese integral-structural worldview. This analysis will enable us for a better understanding of binary categories and of the principle of complementarity.

　It is a well known fact that the classical Chinese worldview was holistic. This holism has often been expressed by the phrase “the unity of Heaven/Nature and men (tianren heyi 天人 合一)”. Chinese thinkers did not categorically or rigidly or distinguish between matter and idea, nor between any other dualistic connotations resulting from this fundamental dichotomy[2]. Much less known or widely accepted is the fact that Chinese holistic worldview was not indiscriminate. The classical Chinese holistic world was by no means a kind of homogenous, monolithic unity in which everything was linked to everything else, without demarcations or distinctions. However, in the Chinese discourses, the demarcation lines between dual notions was mostly blurred, changeable and dynamic. Thus, the classical Chinese worldview was logically ordered and this order was founded upon relatively strict patterns of binary oppositions. On a cognitive level, these binary patterns formed a foundation of specific Chinese analogies[3] that underpinned or provided the grounds for the method of logical thought, which prevailed in traditional China (Cui 2005, 14–24).

　Binary categories can hence be seen as one of the fundamental feature of classical Chinese thought. They are a specific model of duality, which seeks to attain the most realist (possible) state of reality by virtue of relativity, expressed in terms of the relation between two mutually oppositional notions[4].

Distinctions are seen in binary terms, and primarily between pairs of opposites (with even figure and colour reduced to square/round and white/black); having drawn them, and recognized some recurring or persisting pattern (e.g. large, round, hard, heavy, and white) we detach a stone from other things in the same way that we cut out a piece of cloth or chop off a piece of meat. Things are not seen as isolated, each with its own essential and accidental properties; on the contrary, distinguishing characteristics are seen as mostly relative. (Graham 1989, 286)

Here, we have to add that binary oppositions as such are certainly not an exclusive feature of Chinese thought, because in its distinguishing function it generates a fundamental characteristic of human thought. That which distinguishes these binary categories from classical Western dualisms is the principle of complementarity, which represents the fundamental method for their functioning.

The Principle of Complementarity

　This principle represents the foundation of the typical Chinese method of logical reasoning, which is a form of the so-called “correlative thinking”.

　Hall and Ames (1998, 3) expose that reasoning which is based upon rational logic is mostly rooted in analytical, analogical and dialectical methods of argumentation; it is focused upon the explanatory power of formal causation. In contrast, traditional Chinese thought patterns are based upon a particular mode of analogy which may be called “correlative thinking”. This kind of reasoning is determined by associations of image or concept clusters linked to semantic dispositions rather than to formal causation. Correlative thinking is a kind of spontaneous reasoning based upon informal and ad hoc analogical procedures that are presupposing association as well as differentiation. The regulative element in this thought mode is shared patterns of culture and tradition rather than common assumptions about causal necessity.

　In other words: this is a structural pattern of binary oppositions, which differs profoundly from the Cartesian dualistic model. The latter involves namely a dialectic that is posited upon the relation between the bipolar, mutually exclusive oppositions of thesis and antithesis.

Hence, this model is rooted in an opposition, which is – at the same time - also a contradiction. This contradiction generates a tension, in which the mutual negation of thesis and antithesis forms a synthesis. The complementary model, which was prevailing in the Chinese ideational tradition, is instead founded on a non-contradictory opposition between two antagonistic poles which do not exclude but complement each other, and which are interdependent.

　In general, contemporary Chinese theoreticians define this difference as a distinction between two different modes of dialectical reasoning: the “Western”, Hegelian mode tends to expose divisions and contradictions, while the classical Chinese model of dialectical reasoning seeks to achieve a unity between binary oppositions. In his book on the Chinese Forms of Cognition (1998), Wu Chun exposes that in the Western culture, nature and society, objects and subjects (or objectivity and subjectivity), substance and phenomena were mainly seen as dualisms. These dualisms have manifested themselves in the philosophical tradition of bipolar contradictions. According to Wu, Chinese tradition tended towards a unification of oppositions and toward a dialectical integration, rooted in propositions of harmonic coordination. The dominant Western thought, however, tended towards divisions of unity into dualities, i.e. towards a dialectic of contradictions, which arose from paradoxical propositions.

　In the model of complementarity, which prevailed in the Chinese tradition, binary patterns did not generate any separate syntheses that could thus preserve the “positive” elements from their previous state, while at the same time eliminating the “negative” ones. Zhuangzi described such relation between two binary poles of a complementary model as follows:

Therefore, I am saying: why do we not preserve truth and abolish falseness? Why do we not preserve order and abolish chaos? If we think in this way, we do not understand the structure of nature, nor the state of being in which everything exists. This would mean preserving earth and abolishing heaven, preserving yin and abolishing yang. It is quite clear that this would not work. (Zhuangzi 2015. Qiu shui, 5)[5].

　Such an approach to binary relations differs significantly from dualisms as were created in the Judeo-Christian ideational tradition. As noted above, this tradition is determined by the creation of a logocentric binary pattern that follows mutual contradictions of both oppositional poles and tends towards the preservation of one, and the elimination of the other notion. The most significant specific feature of complementary relations, which render them completely different from dualisms of the Cartesian mode, are hence the mutual non- contradictionality of both oppositions, the equivalence and interdependence of both oppositions and their mutual supplementarity. The latter feature also explains why none of the two anti-poles has a primary function, for their mutual interactions surpass limited conceptualizations of time and space and it simultaniously preconditions their very existence.The most important exponent of the Neo-Confucian philosophy, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), described this kind of interaction in the following way:

If we speak about yin and yang and say that yang is the function, whereas yin is the substance, we should realize that yin and yang have no beginning, just as movement and stillness have no culmination. Here, we cannot speak about before and after, or front and back. Today, we are accustomed to saying that before movement there necessarily had to be stillness, and that before any function there had to be some substance. Before perception there should always be solitude and before yang there should always be yin. But before any solitude, there is also some perception and before any stillness there is movement. How can we claim that one came before, and the other after? We cannot speak only about today’s movement and place it at the beginning, and simply forget about yesterday’s stillness. It is the same as breathing. We are accustomed to speaking about inhalation, followed by exhalation. We never speak of them the other way around. Yet, there is an exhalation before any inhalation, just as there is an inhalation before any exhalation[6](Zhu Xi 2015. I, Liqi shang, 1).

Relational reasoning

　At the same time, such complementary relations form the grounds of the classical Chinese analogical model, which represents the crucial type of the traditional Chinese logic. This model, which will be treated more in detail in the next section, represents a specific form of reasoning, which is grounded in the structural ordering of relations.

Words, expressed by rulers are in accordance with the structure and are therefore congruent with the situation of the people. Thus, people can accept his statements. And if they accept them, the correct names are established[7] (Guanzi 2015. Xing shi jie 11).

Contemporary Western logicians explain this feature as follows:

Relational reasoning, including the distinctively human capacity to see analogies between disparate situations, requires the ability to mentally represent and manipulate the relations among concepts. (Knowlton and Holyoak 2009, 1005)

　The supposition, according to which the ability to evaluate the perceptual similarity between stimuli is the sine qua non of human reasoning is commonly recognized as being true. Such ability underlies almost all cognitive processes, from the stimulus generalization and Pavlovian conditioning to the recognition of objects, their conceptualization, categorization and inductive thought. Regardless of our cultural and social backgrounds, we are not merely able to determine the similarity between objects based on congruencies of perception, i.e. we can recognize when two physical stimuli are perceptually similar, but we can also understand when two mental states, ideas, grammatical structures or causal-logical relations are similar as well. Even pre-school children can understand that the relation between a dog and its doghouse is similar to the relation between a bird and its nest, although there is little “object” or “surface” similarity between the constituents of this relation (Penn etc. 2008, 111).

　This type of relational reasoning formed a basis for Chinese analogies and analogical inferences, which, as we shall see below, are grounded upon the presumption that actuality is an organic entirety composed of mutually interconnected parts with similar or even identical functions and attributes and with mutually compatible structures. Analogical inferences belong to the basic types of deductive inferences and represent a relevant cognitive tool which can be used to present hypotheses. For analogical inferences, structure is essential, because similar cognitive methods follow a process of reasoning by which a known segment or aspect of reality forms a model which can be applied in order to recognize another unknown segment or aspect of that same reality, by connecting them through a structure of identical properties[8]. This type of analogy depends on the alignment or mapping of elements in the source and target, not only in regard of objects, but also of relations among them and relations among relations.

Chinese analogisms

　Analogisms as the dominant type of classical Chinese logic, was rooted in the specific social context prevailing in China during the pre-Qin era. Already the earliest Chinese philosophers have often been using this method. They elaborated, developed and investigated it and they applied it to a wide and diversified scope of ideologies. Analogisms belong to general analogical inferences that are founded upon the structural similarity of the objects in question, i.e. upon the identity of two types (or kinds) of objects that have particular attributes in common. After confirming this similarity, we can then conclude that these two types (kinds) of things must also be similar with respect to the rest of their attributes. Hence, if we have two things (A and B) with a series of common properties (e.g. P1, P2…Pn) and if the thing A has the property q, then we can analogically infer and conclude that the thing B also has the property q (Cui and Zhang 2005, 26).

　Analogical inferences are not only inferences that have been drawn between one particular object and another particular object; they also represent a kind of inferences in which the premises are not necessarily linked to the conclusion. The linkage between the premises and the conclusions pertains to the field of probability; hence, this kind of inferences belong to the category of probability inferences.

　However, this classical Chinese method of analogisms still meets the basic requirements of scientific demonstration, for it clarified the origin of certain knowledge, it exposed the logical inevitability of its origins and provided he supporting demonstration (Cui and Zhang 2005, 29). One of the most significant features of classical Chinese analogism is to be found in the fact, that it did not exclusively focus on forms without considering their contents. Such methods could be useful for advocating one’s own ideas or ideologies, while refuting the ones of others. But simultaneously, this method also offered a ground for a greater awareness of social, political and ethical issues. Here, it should also be mentioned that analogism as an inference grounded in similarities between the known and unknown, was not merely a method which could be applied to evaluating existing experiences; in addition, it also had certain epistemological effects. Hence, it was possible to apply it as a model for determining truth.

　As we have seen above, the prevailing Chinese models of inference were also rooted in semantically determined analogies. In classical Chinese logic, analogisms were of utmost importance. This can clearly be seen in many influential works of the pre-Qin era. Germs of specific analogical theories can be found as early as in the Confucian commentary on the Book of Changes(Zhou Yi 周易), and also in the Analects(Lunyu 論語) of Confucius. Many of these elements are contained in the Mohist canon (Mozi 墨子) and in the works of Mencius (Mengzi 孟子) and Xunzi (荀子). Such theories of analogies were later developed by Lü Buwei 呂不韋 in his Commentary on Confucius’ Annals of Spring and Autumn (Lü shi Chunqiu呂氏春秋). In all of these books, we come accross clear indications that the investigation and different applications of analogies was rahter common among Chinese scholars of that time, and that analogisms in China can be traced back to at least the 6th century BC.

　Although Confucius never explicitly and systematically explained or expounded this model, many of his sayings indicate that he considered the application of analogies to be an important element of political and ethical teachings. Here, we should mention the following quotation from the Analects 論語, as recorded by Confucius’ disciple Xue Er 學而. It evidently shows that Confucius was not only well acquainted with the kind of reasoning which is grounded on acquiring knowledge through analogies, but that he also often applied it when inferring from known elements to the unknown ones.

I gave him a hint and he got the whole point[9] (Lunyu 2015. Xue Er, 15).

　A very similar transfer of knowledge was founded on the presumption that elements with similar or identical properties could be treated with the same criteria. The Analects also indicate that Confucius had often instructed his disciples in this type of reasoning. He gave them, for instance, one corner of a rectangle, requiring his students to ponder upon it and to find out the other three corners:

If a disciple is not curious, I will not be willing to teach him. If he is not struggling for the truth, I will not reveal it to him. If I provide one corner and he is not able to come back with the other three, I will not be willing to ask him again[10] (Lunyu 2015. Xue Shu Er, 8)

　The four corners of the rectangle are similar; searching for the other three corners after one is provided, is a kind of analogy. Composing inferences with regard to the other three corners founded on the one that is given, is hence a kind of analogism.

To seek the other three corners from the one, which is given, is a process of analogy. Thus, drawing inferences regarding the other three corners based on the given one is a kind of analogism (Cui and Zhang 2005, 28).

　Even the concept of humanness (ren 仁), which belonged to the the crucial Confucian virtues was, according to Confucius, established as an analogical model: a person who, based upon their own nature, infers to the nature of his fellow human beings, possesses humanness:

The master said: the human being who wishes to establish him or herself, sees that others are established. Wishing him-or herself to be successful, sees that others are successful. To be able to take one’s own feelings as a guide can be called the art of humanness[11] (Lunyu 2015. Yong Ye, 30).

　In this quotation, we come across the term pi 譬, which is used to signify analogy in later texts. Pi is a kind of analogism based on a cognitive process or information transfer from one person to another.

In interpretations of the pre-Qin texts, the character “Pi” 譬 means figuration. Xu Xuan and Xu Kai define the term as “to match”. Therefore, Pi can be interpreted as explaining a knowledge or making it understood by applying suitable corresponding or matching examples (Cui and Zhang 2005, 29).

　Here, Confucius has applied a kind of inference, which contains two oppositional, but similar concepts. They are similar since they belong to the same kind[12]. Here, the crucial concepts are those of the “self” and the “other”, and the inference is based upon the possibility of establishing a thought process, which can link the former concept with the latter. The supposition of putting oneself into other people’s shoes is preconditioned by our knowledge about the others: we have to know who people are before being able to judge their preferences; we cannot namely judge them by our own preferences or inclinations (Cui and Zhang 2005, 29).

　This assumption was elaborated and developed later by Mencius, who, however, grounded his conclusions in logical foundations that were clearly different from those of Confucius. His inferences were based on the notion of kind (lei 類). Human beings, for instance, all belonged to the same kind. In this way, he introduced a new methodological level into the process of specifically Chinese analogy.

Saints and ordinary people are of the same kind[13] (Mengzi 2015. Gongsun Zhou shang, 2).

　Thus, Mencius’ thought was established upon the idea of “humankind”. In his view, all members of “humankind” must necessarily have something in common. According to him, the similarity of minds was the fundamental similarity defining all human beings. Because their minds are composed in the same way, they can mutually directly communicate.

Mencius’ treatises reveal a form of analogical thought, which is based upon the presumption, according to which all human beings are of the same kind. It is clear that these analogies must have been developed on the basis of Confucian teachings, since they required people “to be guided by their own feelings” when dealing with each other. (Cui and Zhang 2005, 30)

　Thus, objects that belonged to the same kind, could thus be treated with the same criteria. Such objects were clearly connected through similar constitution. In other words, they had to be linked through the same structure.

　The structures of everything that exists interact mutually through their kinds[14] (Li ji 2015. Li qi, 30).

　In Daoist works, such systemic linkage between classes or kinds was also seen as the fundamental characteristic of an all-embracing cosmic structure.

Like seeks like, and similar tones respond to one another; this is the structure of the universe[15] (Zhuangzi 2015. Yu fu, 3).

　Hence, true communication between people is possible because the human brain is structured in the same way. The presumption according to which objects of the same kind were mutually connected because they shared the same structure was also the object of attention by Xunzi. His analogies were based on a more rigorous classification of objects into various kinds. Like his predecessors, he also assumed that objects belonging to the same kind could be treated in accordance with the same criteria and by applying the same logical methods. It is very significant that here, the concept of structure was also seen as the main criterion for including specific objects within the same kind:

That which is of the same kind is not in mutual contradiction and always has the same structure[16] (Xunzi 2015. Fei Xiang, 7).

Inferences and their semantic connotations

　We must not forget, however, that the Chinese model of analogical inferences differs in many important aspects from the Greek or Indian model.

In the history of logic, we can find three central traditions of logical reasoning, i.e. the Greek, the Indian and the Chinese. These three traditions have similarities as well as particularities. All three of them are proceeding from the same elementary contents and all of them developed particular modes of inferences. The differences between them result from their particular social conditions and from their specific cultural backgrounds, which both underlay and determined them. Hence, each developed their own specific features, most of which were linked to their respective dominant mode of inferences. (Cui and Zhang 2005, 25)

　While in ancient Greece, the essence of Aristotelian logic manifested itself in the three-part argumentation, in ancient India, the dominant types were the five-branch method, and the three-branch method that evolved from it. In ancient China, the prevailing mode of inference was analogism. Although some theoreticians claim that analogism in Chinese logic (especially in Mohist logic) was identical to the Aristotelian three-part argumentation, there is no convincing proof for this view, which, by the way, has never found acceptance in the wider academic world. As early as in the beginning of the 20th century, Hu Shi questioned Zhang Binglin’s supposition that the Mohists have developed a theory of three-part argumentation, arguing that their theories were grounded on causality rather than on deduction. (Cui and Zhang 2005, 25)

　Tan Jiepu instead asserted that Mohist argumentation was rather similar to ancient Indian logic, given the fact that almost seventy percent of its key terminology was common to both. Wen Gongyi was among those who firmly rejected this view:

The Mohist Argumentation, by Tan Jiepu claims that the Mohist type of inference was basically the same as those found in Western and Indian logic. I do not think such comparisons can grasp the essence of the Mohist logic of argumentation… for logic as an instrument of reasoning is closely linked to linguistic structures. Since different languages are defined by different historical and cultural characteristics, the structures and classifications of different types of logic must also differ. (Wen Gongyi cf Cui and Zhang 2005, 25)

　Hu Shi described the specific features of analogisms that derived from the general characteristics of Chinese logic, in the following way:

Obviously, the formal aspects of Chinese logic are much less relevant than in ancient Indian or traditional European logic.… In essence, they are more of a theoretical than of a formal nature[17] (Hu Shi 1983, 154–5).

　The main characteristic that defines the specificity of such Chinese discourses is connected with the fact that ancient Chinese logicians focused on contents rather than form. The beginnings of such thought can equally be found in old Greek logic, especially in Aristotle, although they were not developed further within the European logical tradition until the beginning of the 20th century, with the emergence of new theories in the philosophy of language.

　Modern Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun argued that a similar form of such logic of disputation (in the sense of arguments and counter-arguments, i.e. of thesis and antithesis) was also developed in ancient Greece. However, in Greece, this method was not elaborated further because the European tradition was rather focused on the development of formal logic. But even the Aristotelian logic implied two central methods: that of evidences and disputation. But while later developments focused upon syllogisms, grounded in the former method, the latter was gradually forgotten (Li Xiankun 2001, 353). Hence, in the Western countries, a new research into the logic of argumentation would not occur before the latter half of the 20th century.

　On the other hand, formal logic also seeks to differentiate between general forms of thought processes, and the object of investigation. Chinese logic differs in this respect as well, for Chinese logicians were more interested in defining semantic (rather than formal) structures, which they then tried to describe by means of explanations and practical examples, than in defining general abstract formulas of propositions and analogies.

　This focus on content rather than form has led to the classification into four main types of analogisms, which the Mohists named “pi” 辟, “mo” 侔, “yuan” 援 and “tui” 推. All these types were apparently based upon descriptive methods: the pi type was based on explanations by examples, the mo type referred to deduction from a parallel series of words, phrases or sentences (“ci”). The yuan type was founded upon potentially similar views and the tui type on agreements with certain views through the negation of contrary views. In ancient China, this attention to contents led to fundamental specific peculiarities in the development of inferences. The systematization that determines the “general” (i.e. European) model of analogical inferences dictates a proposition by which certain relations necessarily imply other relations, regardless of the concrete domain or context (Holyoak 2008, 150). The ancient Chinese analogy also differentiates within this general model between different modes of inferences with respect to the semantic-axiological value of the relations they include.

However, in the Chinese tradition, the validity or non-validity of analogical inferences in addition also depends upon the axiological value of both preceding propositions. To clarify this difference, let us take a look upon two inferences with exactly the same formal structure, but where - according to their authors - the first one is valid, while the second is not.

Black horses are horses. If we ride a black horse, we ride a horse. Female slaves are human beings. If we love a female slave, we love a human being[18] (Mozi 2015. XI, Xiao qu, 4).

　By replacing “female slave” with “thief”, we obtain a structurally and formally equivalent inference worded as follows:

Thieves are human beings. If we love a thief, we love a human being[19] (ibid).

　Even though these two examples are equivalent on the formal level, and even though their premises are certainly true, for the Mohists the former was valid, while the latter was not, for the first one accorded with common sense, while the second one did not[20]. They exposed:

Thieves are human beings, but to love a thief does not mean to love a human being[21] (ibid, 5) .

　Their explanation reads:

How can we clarify this? If we dislike thieves, it does not mean we dislike human beings. If we wish there would be no thieves, this does not mean we wish there would be no human beings. This holds true in the entire world. However, if this is true, then it is also true that to love thieves does not mean to love human beings[22] (ibid).

　It is, of course, quite clear that in this case, the Mohist interpretation does not hold up to closer verification, since thieves - and female slaves - are both subspecies of human beings. Such an equivalence is therefore valid in affirmative arguments, but not necessarily in the negative statements: if all thieves are people, clearly not every human being is a thief. The same also holds true for female slaves. Such factors of of semantic connotations are even more evident in the next example of Mohist argumentation:

A cur is the same as a dog. However, to kill a cur is not the same as to kill a dog[23] (Mozi 2015. X, Jing xia, 155).

The Structural Model of Thought

　Thus, combining meanings appears as one of the main characteristics of classical Chinese.

The formation of classical Chinese sentences tends towards the intrinsic linkage between individual parts of the sentence, and seldom applies formal signs. The grammar of an ancient Chinese sentences is defined by semantic meanings and the word order.

Many synonyms and ambiguities appear in sentences and their structures. These ambiguities are a product of the unlimited possibilities caused by the lack of formal symbols. Therefore, we can understand these sentences only through their contextual meaning. In ancient Chinese, meaning is the most important element of language. To the certain extent, this basic structure has influenced the entire Chinese tradition and culture (Cui and Zhang 2005, 41).

　This particular characteristic of the classical language also influenced the dominant modes of thought that manifested themselves in the processes of inferences, based upon similarity, proximity and identity. Although this did not lead to the development of a “classical” deduction, it did create the typically Chinese mode of analogism.

　Relational propositions represented the basis of the specific logic that has been developed in ancient China, while propositions with a subject-predicate structure were instead typical of ancient Greek logic. Thus, the correlation between dual, however mutually complementary oppositions (before/behind, above/below, etc.) constituted the very source of classical Chinese logic. But, on the other hand, traditional cognitive methods did not remain limited to bipolar models, which merely provided the foundations for elementary and simple methods of comprehension. In such methods, binary pairs (i.e. dual predispositions) appeared as elementary elements or relational models that could be developed into higher or more complex structures or models of multi-layered, plural models of reasoning and comprehension.

　Hence, classical Chinese models of cognition were defined by relations between individual objects of comprehension. They formed a dynamic structure which determined each particular entity through connections and influences between itself and other entities. In his book Chinese forms of Cognition[24], Wu Chun describes the relational, systemic mode of reasoning which was rooted in the specifically Chinese holistic worldview:

Integral reasoning developed another new form, namely relational thought, in which things cannot exist independently, because they are always related to other things. In other words, each single thing can only exist within a relational network or within an integral structure. In fact, nothing can exist outside of this network or structure[25]. (Wu Chun 1998, 312)

　This elementary feature also had a very profound influence on classical Chinese epistemological methods and approaches. In fact, in such approaches the primary object of comprehension is not a particular entity (regardless of whether it belongs to the external or to the internal reality), but rather its relations. Thus, the universe was understood as a complex network of countless, interdependent relations that were connected to and separated from one another in countless ways and on innumerable levels.

　Thus, it is by no means coincidental that the traditional Chinese philosophers did not focus only on the human ability to grasp analogies, but also on the capacity to combine relations into structures of higher orders. They also exposed that in order to make our relational ability operational, an elaborate symbolic system, such as human language, was necessary.

　The influential Han Dynasty scholar Dong Zhongshu, pointed out that, already during the Han Dynasty, the symbolic level of language was grounded upon common meanings:

Names and symbols are pronounced in different ways, but they all arise from the same foundation[26]. (Dong Zhongshu 2015. Shen cha minghao, 1)

　This basis was seen as a structural connection between everything that exists:

[27]When people were creating language, they acted like a blind man: i.e. they followed the symbolic signs of names (concepts) in order to understand their structure. (Dong Zhongshu 2015. Shen cha minghao, 4)

　Therefore, the basic axiom of language and thought was rooted in the assumption that the entities and behaviour of any complex system could not be properly comprehended without first understanding the model of the basic structure of all that exists. The epistemology of relational thought was namely not limited to bipolar or dual models, but tended towards a systemic reasoning which was rooted in the integral structure of reality.

[28]Human thought had to follow relations and was no longer limited to the treatment of independent, isolated entities. If we think of a specific thing, we must simultaneously think of other things that are connected to it. This means we have to consider the impact it has upon other things, as well the impact other things have upon it. It thus becomes clear why such reasoning did not remain limited to a dual structure, but tended towards the development of plural structures. (Wu Chun 1998, 312)

　A cognitive model of this kind is based on seeing the world as a complex and coherent, but simultaneously dynamic structure composed of relations, intersections and interacting feedback loops. Once this structure was perceived and understood, the elementary functioning of the system becomes visible. In such way, the system became predictable; it could not only respond to problems, but also find proper solutions for them.

* The present article is a result of the research work, which was carried out in summer 2015 at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University. Hence, the author would like to express her sincere gratitude to its helpful staff and to Prof. Huang Chun-chieh, Dean of the Institute, for their generous support and help.

Footnotes

[1] 在中國哲學中, '道', 即是宇宙, 人事和人性的本體, 又是以仁義禮智信等為內容的道德實體.

[2] Like, for instance, distinctions between substance and phenomena, subject and object, or creator and creation etc.

[3]The models of analogisms, applied in the context of classical Chinese logic, differs in many respects from the traditional European model in terms of both- its methods and its functions (Cui and Zhang 2005, 25–41).

[4]Some well-known binary categories are: yinyang 陰陽 (sunny/shady), tiyong 體用 (essence/function), mingshi 名實 (concept/actuality), liqi 理氣 (structure/ phenomena), benmo 本末 (roots/crown), and so forth.

[5]故曰，蓋師是而旡非，師治而旡亂乎？是未明天地之理，萬物之情者也。是猶師天而旡地，師陰而旡陽，其不可行明矣。

[6]在陰陽言，則用在陽而體在陰，然動靜無端，陰陽無始，不可分先後。今只就起處言之，畢竟動前又是 靜，用前又是體，感前又是寂，陽前又是陰，而寂前又是感，靜前又是動，將何者為先後？不可只道今 日動便為始，而昨日靜更不說也。如鼻息，言呼吸則辭順，不可道吸呼。畢竟呼前又是吸，吸前又是 呼。

[7]人主出言，順於理，合於民情，則民受其辭，民受其辭，則名聲章.

[8] A historical example of the structural compatibility that defines such inferences can be found in the designing of the first atom models in Europe in the early 20th century. These models were based on the assumption that electrons with a negative charge were moving in circular or elliptical orbits around the atomic core, which had a positive charge. Every atom could therefore be described as a kind of microcosmic solar system. This supposition was based on analogical inference (Elliot 1999, 34). Coulomb’s Law which states that the magnitude of the electrostatic force between two p o int s of electrical charges is d irectl y p ro p o rtional to the product of the magnitudes of each of the charges and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the two charges, is structurally related to Newton’s law of gravitation, which is linked in turn to Kepler’s law of planetary motion.

[9] 告諸往而知來者.

[10] 子曰：不憤不啟，不悱不發。舉一隅而不以三隅反，則不復也.

[11] 子曰：'夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。能近取譬，可謂仁之方也已.

[12] This is a latent supposition; Confucius has considered and applied it, without ever explicitly defining it. This was accomplished later by his follower Mengzi 孟子. However, the concept of kind is mentioned in earlier Confucian classics already, as for instance in the Book of Ritual (Li ji 禮記).

[13] 聖人之于民，亦類也.

[14] 而萬物之理，各以其類相動也.

[15] 同類相從，同聲相應，固天之理也.

[16] 類不悖，雖久同理.

[17] 法式的（Formal）的一方面，自然遠不如印度的因明和歐洲的邏輯，……有學理的基本，卻沒有形式的累贅。

[18] (1) 驪馬，馬也；乘驪馬，乘馬也。獲，人也；愛獲，愛人也。

[19] (2) 雖盜人人也，愛盜，愛人也。

[20] This validation was linked to the ideological stance of the later Mohists, who (in contrast to their staunchest rivals, the Confucians) advocated universal love but were, at the same time, not opposed to capital punishment. Therefore, they had to reconcile this contradiction.

[21] (3) 雖盜人人也，愛盜非愛人也.

[22] 奚以明之？惡多盜，非惡多人也；欲無盜，非欲無人也。世相與共是之。若若是，則雖盜人人也，愛盜非愛人也.

[23] 狗，犬也，而殺狗非殺犬也.

[24] 中國思維形態

[25] 在整體性思維中, 又產生了一種新的形式, 這就是聯繫. 在聯繫的思維中,一個事物或物體通常不會是孤理存在的, 而是與另一個事物或物體有著聯繫. 換言之, 一個事物通常是一個聯系網絡上或整體結構中的 事物. 離開這種網絡或結構的事物, 實際上是不存在的.

[26] 名號異聲而同本.

[27] 民之為言，固猶瞑也，隨其名號以入其理.

[28] 給與此, 人們的思維活動就必須以聯繫的方式運行, 而不是以孤立的方式存在. 當考慮某一個事物時, 就 必須考慮其相關的事物, 這即包括該事物對其他事物的影響, 也包括其他事物對該事物的影響. 可以看出, 整體思維在這裡已走出二元結構, 向多樣結構發展.

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