首頁出版品歷年院訊【宏觀視野】Taiwan's "Shelving and Sharing" Approach to Maritime Diplomacy: Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Taiwan-Japan

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【宏觀視野】Taiwan's "Shelving and Sharing" Approach to Maritime Diplomacy: Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Taiwan-Japan

Grant F. Rhode*

Dr. Rhode teaches International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Region at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, and Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College.

　　The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was ratified by Japan in 1996.[1] Subsequently, Japan embarked on discussions with Taiwan about unresolved Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) interpretations. It took over sixteen years of negotiation for Japan and Taiwan to reach consensus and begin implementation of the Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement (TJFA). Concluded in April, 2013, the TJFA has produced considerable economic gains for Taiwan in the subsequent two years. Japan has had more success on the political and strategic front rather than on the economic front as a result of the agreement and its implementation. Overall, the TJFA has significantly lessened tensions that had come to head in the dramatic water cannon battles between Taiwanese fishing boats and Japanese Coast Guard vessels in late September, 2012.

　　International tensions pointing toward potential conflict in the East and South China Seas have received much attention in recent years, but they go back at least seventy years to the end of World War II. The issues driving these tensions are complex, including variables such as multiple sovereignty claims over the same islands; competing claims over maritime resources, such as hydrocarbons and fish; geostrategic calculations; proliferating nationalisms emphasizing symbolic aspects of the disputes; and changing power dynamics among the regional players. These complexities have made solutions difficult, and there has been little progress toward solutions to date. Notably, maritime tensions seem higher now than at any time since World War II. One formula for stabilization/resolution[2] in the China Seas maritime domain suggested by a number of policy makers and analysts has been to shelve disputes that seem difficult to solve at the moment and make accommodations to share resources in the area of the dispute. This paper is an analysis of such a "shelving and sharing" initiative. The "shelving" must be initiated by political leadership. The "sharing" is an ongoing process involving first, construction of a shared framework agreeable to the parties; and second, careful implementation of the agreed framework that solves ongoing specific problems in a manner that continues to be agreeable to both sides. This paper accepts the legitimacy of "shelving" island sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction positions by both Taiwan and Japan,[3] without prejudice to any ultimate sovereignty resolution, as Taiwan and Japan have agreed in signing the TJFA. This analysis focuses on the "sharing" aspect of the initiative, in this instance, an examination of fishery resource sharing. It includes an examination of the fishing agreement itself, as well as the practicalities of implementation of the agreement from both the Taiwanese and Japanese perspectives.

　　The TJFA is a noteworthy example of a "shelving and sharing" approach to the resolution of international conflicts related to resource sharing. Data from the past two years show that the TJFA and its detailed process of careful implementation have resulted in mutual benefit for both Taiwan and Japan, and hence a net positive development. Based on results of this case analysis, the "shelving and sharing" model merits consideration for application in other circumstances, both regionally and internationally.

　　The philosophical foundation for the TJFA will be presented through introduction of the East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI) and its corollary, the South China Sea Peace Initiative (SCSPI). A review of the content of the TJFA will be followed by a discussion of the process of implementing the TJFA between 2013 and 2015, including a summary of the first four rounds of talks by the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee (TJFC, established by the TJFA), with comment on the impact of these talks. Japanese views of the fisheries talks, agreement implementation, and assessment of the impact on Ryukyu Island fisheries will be followed by Taiwanese views on the talks, agreement implementation, and assessment of the impact on the fisheries economy of northern Taiwan. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made assessing the contribution of the TJFA to dispute resolution in the East China Sea, with a focus on the bilateral impacts on Taiwan and Japan. Implications for possible extension of the East China Sea "shelving and sharing" in the TJFA will be considered through a brief discussion of Taiwan's recent implementation of a 2015 fishing agreement with the Philippines in the South China Sea. Great power contextual aspects of the TJFA, such as China's negative view of it and the U.S. support for it, merit consideration elsewhere but will not be analyzed in this paper. Appendices include an English translation of the TJFA, and maps related to the fishing areas defined by the TJFA.

The East China Sea Peace Initiative and the Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement

　　Tensions in the East China Sea have been rising for many years due to competing interests in resources, strategic position, and shifting political power dynamics. The situation was exacerbated by the collision of a Chinese fishing trawler with Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands in 2010. In September, 2012, the Japanese government escalated tensions further when it announced its purchase of three islands in the area. In a move to counter the possibility of conflict, Republic of China (Taiwan) President Ma Ying-jeou[4] announced his concept for an East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI) on August 5, 2012.[5] The date of the announcement was exactly fifty years from the date when the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China went into effect on August 5, 1952. Five key aspects of the ECSPI include:

1) Refraining from taking any antagonistic actions,

2) Shelving controversies and not abandoning dialogue,

3) Observing international law and resolving disputes through peaceful means,

4) Seeking consensus on a code of conduct in the East China Sea, and

5) Establishing a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in the East China Sea.

The aspects of the ECSPI that have the most practical implications for avoidance of conflict and resource sharing without prejudicing other positions related to Taiwan's and Japan's relationship are points 2) shelving controversies, and 5) cooperation in exploring and developing resources. Following three years of implementation of the ECSPI beginning on August 5, 2012, President Ma Ying-jeou subsequently announced a related South China Sea Peace Initiative (SCSPI) on May 26, 2015. We will return to discussion of the SCSPI before the concluding remarks.

　　The first practical fruit of the ECSPI was the 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement (TJFA) signed on April 10, 2013.[6] Negotiations had proceeded between the civilian national fishing associations, non-official state representatives of Taiwan and Japan, for over sixteen years prior to the final TJFA signing in 2013. It should be kept in mind that Japan's diplomatic relations shifted from the ROC (Taiwan) to the PRC (Mainland) in 1972, so talks between Taiwan and Japan have not been at the official level since then. The parties negotiating the TJFA were Taiwan's Association of East Asian Relations (AEAR), and the Interchange Association of Japan (IAJ). The TJFA was signed by the Chairmen of these associations. There is a precedent for the effectiveness of such "unofficial" agreements in addressing maritime disputes in Asia. For example, Japan negotiated fishing agreements with mainland China during the 1950s and 1960s, before diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in 1972.[7] The text of TJFA includes five articles and are dedicated respectively to:

1) Philosophy and general principles,

2) Latitude and longitude points describing the area of agreed mutual use in the East China Sea,

3) Establishment of a Fisheries Committee for implementing the agreement,

4) A "without prejudice" clause indicating that nothing in the fishing discussions would impact sovereignty or maritime law positions of the parties, and

5) Execution of the agreement by the parties with provision for termination, if desired.

　　The language of principles in TJFA Article 1 parallels the language of the East China Sea Peace Initiative in very similar terms, such that it "aims to maintain peace and stability in the East China Sea, promote cordial and mutually beneficial cooperation, achieve the reasonable use and conservation of marine life resources in the exclusive economic zone, and maintain order in fisheries operations." It is somewhat unusual for economic agreements to include such language, and in this case, the similarities of the language to ECSPI are apparent. Article 2 details the area of joint fishing use cooperation south of 27 degrees north latitude, defined by latitude and longitude coordinates.

　　The principle clause in the TJFA related to implementation of the agreement's stated purpose, that is to promote beneficial cooperation and maintain order in fishery operations, is Article 3 establishing the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee (TJFC). During the first two years of TJFA implementation, the TJFC has held four meetings which have addressed a number of practical issues and problems encountered by fishermen from both sides when fishing in the newly established zone of cooperation identified in the TJFA. The Fishery Committee meeting members agreed on proposed solutions to these problems. In some cases, particularly difficult problems have resulted in a decision to try out a solution, and to hold a review in the next meeting to assess the success of the implementation of the agreed solution. Following is a review of problems encountered, issues addressed, and decisions made during the first four meetings of the TJFC spring, 2013, to spring/summer 2015.

　　The first round of TJFC talks were held in Okinawa, Japan, during May, 2013. It covered disputes when operating in overlapping waters, but failed to achieve substantive consensus according to subsequent news reportage. The problems uncovered by the talks related to the fact that Japanese longline fishing vessels tend to deploy their fishing gear in a north-south direction, while Taiwanese boats deploy in an east-west direction. In such a situation, gear can become entangled, prompting disputes.[8] Although resolution was not found during this first meeting, the meeting provided a venue to identify problems and work in a constructive manner toward solutions, including preliminary discussions on how to resolve problems encountered due to boats' sharing the fishing grounds.[9]

　　The second round of talks were held in Suao, Taiwan, during December, 2013. During the two-day meeting, the talks addressed the question raised in the first meeting on the compass orientation of the nets, but also added the dimension of the distance to be kept between fishing boats. Japanese boats not only fish north to south, but they also keep four nautical miles between boats. The Japanese proposed that this be the standard, as opposed to that of the Taiwan boats, which more usually fish east to west in orientation, and tend to keep one nautical mile as a standard distance between boats.

　　In response to the standard proposed by the Japanese, Chen Chun-sheng, head of the Suao Fishermen's Association, indicated that there are about one hundred fifty Taiwanese fishing boats operating in Taiwan-Japan overlapping waters, while Japan operates only a "few dozen" boats in the area. He said that if the Taiwanese were to comply with the Japanese request, only fifty Taiwanese boats could operate in overlapping waters. He hoped that agreement could be reached in the current round of talks. Under the agreement, Taiwanese and Japanese fishing boats may freely operate in a 74,300 square kilometer area, including the additional 4,350 square kilometers in the agreement, without harassment by Japanese authorities, or being chased away.[10]

The third round of talks were held in Taipei at the National Taiwan University, during January, 2014, again in a two-day meeting. Taiwan was represented by Lo Koon-tsan, Secretary General of the Association of East Asian Relations (AEAR), and Japan was represented by Kenichi Okada, Secretary General of the Interchange Association of Japan (IAJ) Taipei Office. The Japanese sought agreement on maintaining a distance between boats of four nautical miles (7.4 kilometers). Officials and fishermen had met over the previous eight months to attempt achieving consensus.[11]

　　Following this third round of meetings, James Sha, Director General of the Fishery Agency in Taiwan, said that compromise was reached between the parties. The agreements included no exclusion of fishing boats from either side in fishing grounds shared by the two entities. Additionally, ground rules were established to avoid friction caused by different operating methods. He said that all boats will adopt Japan's method of operations in trapezoidal zone Z1 east of the Diaoyutai from May to early July, and in triangular zone Z2 north of Yaeyama from April to July, the traditional tuna fishing season. At other times of the year, fishing boats would adopt the Taiwanese approach. Japan will notify Taiwanese fishing associations before boats can operate in these two areas. These rules were set up to prevent conflict due to Japanese fishermen's north-south fishing orientation and to keep four nautical miles between fishing boats, versus Taiwan fishermen's east-west fishing method, keeping one nautical mile between boats. Japan's Yaeyama Islands fishermen expressed concern about being forced out of the Z2 area by large numbers of Taiwanese boats converging there since the agreement was signed. Finally, both sides agreed that all vessels in the area needed to be insured.[12]

　　The fourth round of talks were held in Tokyo during March, 2015, in a three-day closed door session. Amendments to the fishery committee guidelines were agreed in which Japanese and Taiwanese fishing boats would fish during different times of day north of Yaeyama, and maintain a distance between them of four nautical miles. In other zones, the Taiwan fishermen may deploy east to west. The amendments were to remain in effect for a year and would be reviewed again at the subsequent annual meeting. Hsu Juei-hu, Taiwan's deputy representative to Japan, led the meeting from Taiwan's side, and Tsay Tzu-yaw, director general of the Fisheries Agency, was the main negotiator. Michihiko Komatsu, head of the Interchange Association of Japan's general affairs section, led the Japanese delegation.[13]

　　In general, the benefits of the TJFA appear to have been substantial for Taiwanese fishermen, as their tuna catches have doubled since the TJFA went into effect, according to news reports. There may be less economic bonus for the Japanese fishermen. During the 1990s though 2000s, Japan interpreted the United Nations Law of the Sea regarding its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) such that the Japanese forced Taiwanese boats out of the area south of the Senakaku/Diaoyutai islands, an area where Taiwan and Japan agreed to joint fishing in the TJFA.[14]

　　There are political considerations involved in the TJFA and its implementation. Japanese Prime Minister Abe sought rapprochement with Taiwan by allowing its fishermen into disputed waters at the expense of Japan's fishermen. For example, this has led to news reports that the fishing port of Suao, Taiwan, is booming. Fisherman Lin Yuan-zhuang said that high-value bluefin tuna love the triangle south of Diaoyutai because waters are deep, stating that Japan's Coast Guard formerly fined Taiwan fishing boats 4,000,000 yen (US$ 40,000) when impounding Taiwanese boats in those waters. Japan began this procedure in 1994 when the UNCLOS came into force. Chen Chung-sheng, chair of the Suao Fishermen's Association, reported that it took little fuel to travel from Suao to Diaoyutai running on the Kuroshio current and returning on the parallel southward Qing current. He said that the Japanese rarely travelled to the islands because the 3,000 meter deep trough separating Diaoyutai from Ishigaki was dangerous, and there were rich fishing grounds near Okinawa that are easier to access from Ishigaki. James Sha, involved with fishery talks since the mid-1990s, said that Japan's Foreign Ministry inaugurated the shift toward pursuing the talks. Aside from the North-South/East-West fishing methods difference, he noted that Japanese hooked lines are thinner than Taiwanese lines, resulting in more damage to Japanese lines when they become tangled. He added that Taiwanese boats would not be able to continue the North-South orientation, because it would require setting 56 kilometer-long nets in waters closed off by the Japanese. Sha commented that the Suao vessels caught twice as many bluefin tuna in those waters as they did previously. Chen Ching Chang, a political scientist at Ritsumeikan AP University, observed that Prime Minister Abe had to deal with relatively few fishermen around the Senkakus, a small political price to pay for favoring Taiwan's fishermen and thereby achieving political/strategic gains.[15] Abe went ahead with the Futenma base relocation on Okinawa in the face of unpopular Okinawan response, using the fishery concession to neutralize Taiwan while China-Japan tensions remain high.

　　Although there appears to be successes as part of the outcome of the TJFA and its implementation, it is still early to determine the ultimate impact of the agreement. The sovereignty claims issue could rise closer to the surface again. The future could bring changes to the political backdrop in the manner in which the TJFA is implemented, particularly in response to electoral politics and governmental transitions.[16]

Japanese Views

　　From the Japanese perspective, the negotiation impasse was broken when the Japanese Ministry of Fish and Agriculture, backed by the Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the local Okinawa Fisheries Association giving advice on how to make rules and solve problems. Communication was largely from the top down, with little input from the local associations back to the ministries.

　　The core of the agreement established an area within which joint fishing arrangements would be permitted, an area largely inside the overlapping EEZs claimed by Taiwan and Japan. The TJFA provided the definition of the agreed overlap area in Article 2 by establishing perimeter boundaries using points of latitude and longitude. The practicalities of how to jointly exploit the mutually-shared area of sea was left to the ongoing work of the TJFC and its mandate as promulgated by Article 3 of the TJFA. Topics identified in the TJFA for the TJFC to address with working guidelines include not harming sea life resources through overdevelopment, ensuring navigational and operational safety of fishing vessels, and other aspects of fishery industry cooperation, though notably, some items were not specified. The composition of the committee was to include two chief representatives from each side, with additional participants drawn in to bring their particular expertise. In principle, the TJFC is to meet once per year, with interim meetings as necessary. It may invite fishery-related civil groups to join. It is to operate by consensus including all full committee members.

　　Two Japanese viewpoints regarding the TJFA are clear. From the Japanese national government perspective, the TJFA served to disaggregate the Taiwanese position from the Chinese position in the East China Sea. In other words, more cooperation and friendship between Taiwan and Japan isolates China and its position, rather than Japan being more isolated in relation to a unified position of Taiwan and China. From the local economic perspective based on the fishing industry in the Ryukyu Islands, further cooperation is a double-edged sword.[17] On the one hand, having to share fishing resources with Taiwanese boats that formerly had been driven out of the area by Japanese Coast Guard vessels might be seen as a net economic loss, with specific negative impact on some Japanese fishing families. On the other hand, the establishment of rules of fishing engagement in the area mutually fished by both parties has reduced conflict, damage, and loss of gear, a win-win result for both sides.

　　The two Japanese maps in the appendices show the Japanese interpretation of the TJFA and issues facing the TJFC. The map in Appendix 2 defines the area of mutual sea resource sharing contained in the demarcation points found in Article 2 of the TJFA. The schematic map in Appendix 3 shows triangle and trapezoidal shaped areas found on the south and east sides of the 74,200 square kilometer area defined in Article 2. Subdivision in these two schematic map segments in Appendix 3 identifies areas where cooperative implementation procedures have been established, and blank areas where negotiations toward procedures acceptable to both sides remain ongoing. A brief review of these two maps will help clarify points of TJFC discussion, potential conflict, and approaches toward solution in these two sub-regions of the larger defined area of mutual use.[18]

　　The triangle, the area with the highest value of fish, has five subsections. Bluefin tuna are caught in abundance here. The first grade fish are sent to the Tokyo fish market at Tsukiji, while lower grades are distributed locally.[19] Resolution of fishing procedures has been implemented in the wings of the triangle, but there is not yet agreement on the two large central sections of the triangle. In the ends of the triangle, the Japanese boats fish north to south, and the Taiwanese boats fish east to west, so as to remain outside of Japanese waters not covered by the agreement. The nets are 25 miles long (45 kilometers). In the east and west tips of the triangle, Taiwanese boats fish midnight to 7:00am, while Japanese boats fish 7:00am to 3:00pm. Seasonal fishing preference is between April and the end of July. This preferred season is based on good catches being available during that period, as well as to avoid the immediately subsequent typhoon season during the late summer.

　　From the local Japanese point of view, there is a question about why this triangular section was put into the TJFA for mutual marine exploitation. It is not an area originally claimed within the Taiwan marine demarcation line before the successful TJFA negotiation in 2013. Since it is a location of the highest value fish, it is a place that Taiwanese fishermen want to fish, and did so with conflictual results prior to the TJFA. In the earlier period, according to Japanese accounting, Taiwanese boats fished wherever they wanted, and Japanese boats "gave warning." That is to say, Taiwanese boats were prohibited from fishing in this area by the Japanese Coast Guard.

　　The trapezoid area in the maps does not have as high value fish as does the triangular area.[20] However, two geographically defined zones of separate fishing were defined in the trapezoid area. It is agreed that the northeast section would be fished exclusively by the Japanese, and the southwest section would be fished exclusively by the Taiwanese. In the southeast, neither side is to fish. In the northwest, four nautical miles are to be kept between boats, and Taiwanese fishing boats are to drop nets only one time per day.

　　Thus, the implementation procedures as formulated and executed by the TJFC over the past two years has included a variety of measures. Differing procedures on how to fish, when to fish, and where to fish have been defined in the triangular and trapezoidal map areas and their sub-regions in order to facilitate cooperative implementation. The negotiations are a work in progress, with some procedures being acceptable to both parties, and others requiring a "try it out and reassess at the next meeting" approach.

　　The Japanese are concerned about the disparity in the larger number and size of boats used by Taiwan when compared to the Japanese fishing fleet in the area. Taiwan uses about 150 boats.[21] By comparison, about 50-60 Japanese boats fish in the area covered by the agreement. These are mostly from Yaeyama Islands, primarily Ishigaki and Miyako Island, with a few boats from Okinawa. Japanese boats tend to be smaller, but have a higher level of technology.[22]

　　From the preceding summary, one can see that issues have been successfully addressed by the TJFC meetings and subsequent implementation procedures. Previously, when nets got tangled, Taiwanese nets of heavier construction created significant damage for the Japanese nets. Some nets are 25 miles (40 kilometers) long, making for likely snares, especially when boats are not fishing in the same direction. Procedures for avoiding snagging nets of one another's fishing boats include agreement, for instance, for Japanese to fish north-south during the day, and Taiwanese to fish east-west at night. Although not necessarily happy with having to share fishing grounds formerly exclusively theirs, the Japanese state that the TJFA has been helpful in resolving problems, and hence there is less trouble. The TJFA has had a positive effect by creating a practical mechanism to avoid disputes, for instance through agreement on the morning and afternoon split of fishing time usage.[23]

　　Article 4 of the TJFA is a "without prejudice" clause which states that implementation of the TJFA will not undermine Taiwan's and Japan's underlying claims to sovereignty or maritime rights. Opinion from the Japanese side is that the TJFA has had no effect at all on its sovereignty claim to the Senkaku Islands. Regarding the prohibition against fishing in the twelve nautical mile territorial limit of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, the purported rationale for Japan not to fish there had nothing to do with the TJFA, but rather was a voluntary Japanese response to concerns about its relations with China.[24]

　　Ishigaki has several fishing ports, the three largest of which are in Ishigaki City on the southwest corner of the island: Tonoshiro, Ishigaki, and Arakawa Fishing Ports. These three ports are home to about 160 fishing boats varying from about 25 to 45 feet in length.[25] Some fraction of these boats fish in the TJFA area. These are relatively small boats for fishing large distances from home, such as fifty to eighty nautical miles away, above the Okinawa Trench between Ishigaki and the Senkaku Islands. Ishigaki is the closest of the Ryukyu Islands to the Senakakus, and is the place from which Japan exercises administrative control over the Senkakus.

　　According to Masahiro Kanna, Deputy Mayor of Ishigaki, fishing accounts for about 7% of overall profits in the agriculture and fishing sector of the Ishigaki economy, a relatively small proportion of the overall profit in this sector. In contract, sugarcane production and livestock total about 50% and 13%, respectively, of total profits in the agriculture and fishing sector. The black beef cattle raised in Ishigaki are highly valued, and many islanders and restaurant advertisers consider Ishigaki beef to be the best in Japan.[26]

　　In terms of impact for fishing families, the profit per fishing boat is calculated to be between US$20,000 and US$30,000. This is a modest return for each boat, but it does contribute basic income for about 2% of Ishigaki's population.

　　As a further context for how fishing fits into the Ishigaki economy, tourism has become a much more profitable sector of the Ishigaki economy, producing profits over 35 times higher than fishing. Tourism produces US$4,300 profit per capita, while fishing produces about US$115 profit per capita.[27] Professor Hiroshi Kakuzu has compared population and tourism development on four islands, two in the Taiwan Strait, Penghu and Kinmen, and two in the Ryukyus, Miyako and Ishigaki.[28] His work shows how Ishigaki has pushed tourism forward as an economic driver more dramatically than the other three islands have been able to do.

Taiwanese Views

　　Taiwanese accounts of the fisheries negotiations and agreement implementation vary slightly from the Japanese accounts.[29] For example, Taiwanese negotiators mention the same triangle and quadrilateral areas discussed by the Japanese negotiators, but with different emphasis on their relative importance. According to a Taiwanese negotiator, significant time was spent conferring on the specifics of boundary details of the joint use fishing area. Most importance was given to the large triangle bordering the Okinawa trench along the southern boundary of the shared fishing area. Japanese negotiators cite the number of Japanese fishing vessels in the joint use area at 50 to 60 boats, while Taiwanese negotiators thought that 30 boats would be a generous estimate. Taiwan's negotiators expressed a stronger feeling about the win-win nature of the negotiations and the implementation of the fishing agreement than did Japanese negotiators.

As agreement has been reached at the fishing committee meetings of the TJFA, the Taiwan Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, has developed and distributed communications related to fisheries regulation. As an example, the following paragraph details a set of recent regulations that demonstrate how Taiwanese authorities may police implementation of the TJFA so that the intent of the agreement may be enforced in the fishing grounds to the satisfaction of the parties involved.[30]

　　In March, 2014 the Taiwan Council of Agriculture added 20 articles to the Fishing Act related to decisions made by the TJFC, and the summary following gives a flavor of the care employed to establish a regime for uniform enforcement of TJFA provisions. The articles provide regulatory language requiring that longline fishing vessels receive authorization to fish in the maritime area per the sea chart delineating the area, and that they install automatic location communicators which allow the vessels to be tracked. For authorization to fish in the designated TJFA joint fishing area, applications must be made to the Suao Fishermen's Association accompanied by a valid appropriate fishing license, a certificate of proof of testing of the installed automatic location communicator on the vessel, proof of payment for the automatic location communicator, and proof that the regional fishermen's association to which the fishery operator belongs consents to provide assistance in handling marine accidents, such as collision. Operator applications must be renewed on an annual basis by March 15. The Suao Fishermen's Association must submit a register of applications to the central authority annually by March 31. The central authority then issues permits for up to one year to operate in the TJFA-designated fishing area. Permits are not issued for Taiwanese vessels which are involved in unresolved disputes with Japanese vessels. Automatic location communicators must be maintained year-round, including when vessels are in port. When a vessel intends to leave port, the local unit of the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration must be notified to check the communicator to make sure that it is turned on and operable, and is being monitored by the fishery radio station of the local district fishermen's association monitoring center. Vessel locations are automatically reported hourly. Vessels not reporting hourly are required to return to port for repairs. The fishery operator bears the cost of installation and maintenance of the communicator. The Suao Fishermen's Association is required to set up teams and elect commanders to implement these regulations. Operator catch logbooks are to be submitted to the Suao Fishermen's Association before leaving port. All TJFA regulated catches are to be landed in the Nanfangao port of Suao harbor for inspection, with landing record provided. Inspections are not to be refused. Within the TJFA fishing grounds, fishing gear is not to be discarded or picked up. Entangled lines are not to be severed unless necessary, and the entity severing a longline is responsible for repairing it. Disputes with a Japanese fishing vessel are to be reported promptly to the Suao Fishermen's Association. Agreed daily schedules, geographic restrictions, and specified direction of fishing in the regulation documents are to be followed. Late arriving boats will defer position to earlier arriving boats in the fishing grounds. Vessels must allow observers from the central authority on board, and provide them with the same accommodation and medical facilities available for crew. Captains must ensure the observer's safety, and must allow the observer to collect data and provide a signature on data collected. National patrol vessels may board and inspect fishing vessels. Provisions for license suspension or fines of NT$30,000-NT$150,000 (US$1,000-US$5,000) are specified for violation of the above regulations as noted in articles 18 and 19 that entered into force on May 5, 2014.

　　Even though these regulations may appear onerous, the economic results for Taiwan's fisherman have been highly beneficial. A recent report shows that the number of large, high value tuna caught jumped from 1,146 in 2013, to 1,671 in 2014, to 1,917 during the first six months of 2015.[31] The 2015 number is approximately 3.5 times that of 2013. In the eight years prior to the 2013 implementation of the fishing agreement, Japan interfered with 345 Taiwanese fishing boats, an average of 43 per year. In the two years following implementation of the 2013 agreement, Japan interfered with 22 Taiwanese fishing boats,[32] an average of 11 per year. Interference with Taiwan's fishing boats by Japanese authorities appears to be down 75% following implementation of the TJFA.

The South China Sea Peace Initiative and the Taiwan-Philippine Fishing Agreement

　　On May 9, 2013, an incident occurred in waters claimed by both Taiwan and the Philippines per the UNCLOS 200 mile exclusive economic zone provision. Personnel aboard a Philippine Coast Guard vessel fired on Taiwanese fishing vessel Guang Da Xing.[33] Hung Shih-cheng, the father of the skipper, was killed by gunfire in this incident, resulting in significant political and diplomatic negotiations between Taiwanese and Philippine officials. Taiwan demanded acknowledgment of shooting, reparations, and negotiations toward a Taiwan-Philippine Fishing Agreement, which subsequently commenced. Some momentum from the Taiwan side accrued when President Ma Ying-jeou announced the South China Sea Peace Initiative (SCSPI) on May 26, 2015, in many ways parallel to the principles of the East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI) of August 5, 2012, but also adding a SCSPI provision guaranteeing freedom of navigation and overflight. In order to prevent further violent incidents regarding disputes over fishing in waters jointly claimed by Taiwan and the Philippines, negotiations toward a fishing agreement continued through the summer of 2015, with weekly reports of an imminent breakthrough on an agreement. It was concluded on November 5, 2015, and was referred to as the Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries Matters.[34] News articles stated that the agreement was to be jointly published "at an opportune time," but indicated that the agreement was more limited than the TJFA, for the moment encompassing only provisions related to law enforcement. The agreement is reported to have seven articles, with three consensuses implemented prior to signing: 1) no violence, 2) emergency notification procedures, and 3) prompt release. The agreement was announced by Taiwan Minister of Foreign Affairs David Lin on November 19, 2015. The first technical working group (TWG) was held immediately after signing. The second TWG is scheduled for January-February, 2016 in Manila, and will work on 12 and 24 nautical miles limits, an item that was not resolved in the first talks. Thus, the Taiwan-Philippine fisheries implementation talks have established a parallel process to the Taiwan-Japan fisheries implementation talks. However, the Taiwan Fishermen's Associations want to go further, and work toward cooperation in overlapping economic zones in a way more similar to the TJFA, and they do not want the fishing agreement to be limited only to law enforcement.

The timing of the announcement of the agreement was delayed pending other diplomatic developments in the region. Although agreement was concluded on November 5, 2015, it was not announced until after the conclusion of the President Ma Ying-jeou—President Xi Jinping summit meeting in Singapore on November 6, 2015,[35] and the APEC meetings in Manila on November 18 and 19, 2015.[36] After the fisheries agreement announcement that followed the APEC meeting in Manila, Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou stated that the Taiwanese navy will protect its fishermen. [37]

Concluding Remarks

　　The review of data on the negotiation and implementation of the TJFA demonstrates that the agreement has led to a reduction of tension and improved relations between Taiwan and Japan in the East China Sea between 2013 and 2015. In this case, a "shelving and sharing" approach has helped make progress toward stability, moving events closer to resolution of complicated disputes in the East China Sea. Overall, Taiwan has gained significant economic benefits at the level of its local fishing economy, while giving up some formerly strident pressure on Japan for short-term resolution of the political question of the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty claim. Japan has gained comparatively little at the level of the local fishing economy, but has profited politically by strengthening its ties with Taiwan, and thereby reducing the level of tension that it faces in the East China Sea. Thus, the conclusion of the TJFA in 2013, and the first two years of its implementation appear to have led to a win-win result, but with an asymmetry of relative economic and political successes by Taiwan and Japan, respectively.

　　The agreement has set a precedent that is subsequently providing a model for improving relations between Taiwan and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Implementation is imperfect in both the East China Sea and South China Sea cases, but the ongoing fishing agreement committee work in each situation provides a venue and a process to continue moving forward on unresolved sources of friction between the parties involved.

　　It is worthwhile for parties involved in other maritime disputes, especially in the South China Sea, to study the "shelving and sharing" model that has emerged from Taiwan's East and South China Sea Peace Initiatives. Each dispute is different from the next one, but the Taiwan cases discussed here provide a valuable model for resource sharing in the context of a complex political and strategic environment. Important aspects of this example include establishing a general philosophical framework, the will to hammer out an agreement, and establishment of effective mechanisms and communication processes for incrementally resolving differences over time between disputant parties.

　　The importance of statesmanship should not be underestimated in this case analysis. It is worth keeping in mind that President Ma and Prime Minister Abe found a way to break a sixteen year deadlock in negotiations in order to move toward the win-win situation reviewed here.

Appendix 1: Fisheries Agreement between the Association of East Asian Relations and the Interchange Association, Japan[38]

　　The Association of East Asian Relations and the Interchange Association, Japan (hereafter "the Two Associations") have established this mutual cooperation agreement in terms of the relevant contents set forth in Point 3 of the "Mutual Overseas Offices Establishment Agreement for the Association of East Asian Relations and the Interchange Association, Japan" in order to obtain consensus from the competent authorities for the various items as follows:

Article 1 The Agreement aims to maintain peace and stability in the East China Sea, promote cordial and mutually beneficial cooperation, achieve the reasonable use and conservation of the marine life resources in the exclusive economic zone, and maintain order in the fishery operations.

Article 2 (1) Regarding the East China Sea waters south of 27 degrees north latitude, the region is committed to the reasonable use and conservation of the marine life resources as well as maintaining order in the fishery operations. Due to the consensus on the necessity to establish specific measures for the sea region as soon as possible, this Agreement shall apply to the exclusive economic zone (hereafter "Sea Region Applicable to the Agreement") divided by the lines passing sequentially through the coordinate points listed as follows:

(a) 27 degrees north latitude, 126 degrees 20 minutes east longitude

(b) 27 degrees north latitude, 122 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(d) 24 degrees 49 minutes 37 seconds north latitude, 122 degrees 44 minutes east longitude

(e) 24 degrees 50 minutes north latitude, 124 degrees east longitude

(f) 25 degrees 19 minutes north latitude, 124 degrees 40 minutes east longitude

(g) 25 degrees 29 minutes 45 seconds north latitude, 125 degrees 20 minutes east longitude

(h) 25 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 125 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(i) 25 degrees 32 minutes 17 seconds north latitude, 125 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(j) 25 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, 126 degrees east longitude

(k) 26 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 126 degrees east longitude

(l) 27 degrees north latitude, 126 degrees 20 minutes east longitude

(2) Given the complexity of the current fishery situation in the area of the Sea Regions Applicable to the Agreement divided by the lines passing sequentially through the coordinate points listed below, the area is designated as the special cooperation sea region dedicated to the special needs of reasonable use and conservation of the marine life resources as well as maintaining order in the fishery operations.

(a) 26 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 126 degrees east longitude

(b) 26 degrees 20 minutes north latitude, 125 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(d) 25 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, 126 degrees east longitude

(e) 26 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 126 degrees east longitude

(3) The Two Associations shall request their respective competent authorities to provide support for the reasonable use and conservation of the marine life resources as well as maintaining order for the fishery operations in the special cooperation sea region based on the following principles.

(a) The fishery practitioners of Taiwan and Japan (hereafter "the Parties") shall give maximum respect to each other based on cordial and mutually beneficial operation cooperation.

(b) The Parties shall give maximum effort to create a fishery environment that avoids disputes between the fishery practitioners.

(c) The relevant specific issues in the special cooperation sea region shall be negotiated by the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Committee established pursuant to Article 3 of this Agreement.

(4) The Two Associations have entered into this cooperation under the premise of preventing harm to the sea life resources caused by over development. The Sea Region Applicable to the Agreement is divided by the lines passing sequentially through the coordinate points listed below. Because the fishery practitioners of Japan and Taiwan are not subject to the fishery-related laws of the opposing country, the Two Associations shall request their relevant competent authorities to complete the relevant legal measures within 30 days after the parties have signed this Agreement.

(a) 27 degrees north latitude, 126 degrees 20 minutes east longitude

(b) 27 degrees north latitude, 122 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(d) 24 degrees 49 minutes 37 seconds north latitude, 122 degrees 44 minutes east longitude

(e) 24 degrees 50 minutes north latitude, 124 degrees east longitude

(f) 25 degrees 19 minutes north latitude, 124 degrees 40 minutes east longitude

(g) 25 degrees 29 minutes 45 seconds north latitude, 125 degrees 20 minutes east longitude

(h) 25 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 125 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(i) 26 degrees 20 minutes north latitude, 125 degrees 30 minutes east longitude

(j) 26 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 126 degrees east longitude

(k) 27 degrees north latitude, 126 degrees 20 minutes east longitude

(5) The Two Associations shall continue to negotiate regarding to the sea region of mutual concern under the principle of cordial and mutually beneficial cooperation in order to achieve reasonable use and conservation of the marine life resources as well as maintenance of order in the fishery operations.

Article 3 (1) The Two Associations have established the "Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee" (hereafter "the Committee") in order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement.

(2) The Committee shall comprise of two representatives or agents from each of the Two Associations.

(3) The Committee shall discuss the following matters and record the meeting results. The Two Associations shall submit the meeting records to their respective competent authorities and request the relevant competent authorities to take the necessary measures so that their contents may be practically executed.

(a) The relevant items that ensure the sea life resources of the Sea Region Applicable to the Agreement would not be harmed due to over development;

(b) The relevant items that ensures the navigation and operational safety of fishing vessels for the Sea Region Applicable to the Agreement;

(4) The respective representatives or agents of the Two Associations may convene meetings, and invite representatives of the relevant authorities who have professional knowledge to attend the meetings as special members.

(5) The committee shall meet once a year in principle, and hold the meetings in Tokyo and Taipei alternatively. Interim meetings may be held when deemed necessary by the Two Associations.

(6) The Committee may conduct joint meetings with the fishery-related civil groups as needed.

(7) The decision of the Committee must receive consensus from the full committee members.

Article 4 All of the matters or measures adopted in the implementation of this Agreement shall not impact the relevant marine law positions of the competent jurisdictional authorities of the respective parties.

Article 5 This Agreement shall enter into force during the signature date, except if either party of the Two Associations has intended to terminate the force of this Agreement six months in advance and have notified the other party in writing to terminate this Agreement.

This Agreement is made in duplicates in Chinese and Japanese, and the meaning of the content in the two languages is identical and authentic. The representatives of the Two Associations shall sign the Agreement on April 10, 2013 in Taipei to be observed by the parties.

For the Association of East Asian Relations

Liao Liou-yi

For the Interchange Association, Japan

Mitsuo Ohashi

Appendix 2: Map 1[39]

Appendix 3: Schematic Map 2[40]

* The author conducted field research for this paper in northern Taiwan and in Japan's Ryukyu islands of Okinawa, Miyaki, and Ishigaki during the summer of 2015. A research grant was provided by the Taiwan Fellowship program of the ROC (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is gratefully acknowledged. The author is also grateful for the support of colleagues at the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Science at National Taiwan University, at the University of the Ryukyus, and at the Center for the Study of Asia at Boston University.

Notes

[1] Acronyms used in the subsequent discussion include:

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

TJFA Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement

TJFC Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee

ECSPI East China Sea Peace Initiative

SCSPI South China Sea Peace Initiative

AEAR Association of East Asian Relations, party representing Taiwan for the TJFA

IAJ Interchange Association of Japan, party representing Japan for the TJFA

[2] See Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B. Roberts, "The South China Sea: Stabilization and Resolution," in The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, Legal, and Regional Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2015).

[3] The Taiwan position and argument are clearly stated in "The Republic of China's Sovereignty Claims over the Diaoyutai Islands and the East China Sea Peace Initiative," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), November, 2013. The arguments and documents draw on logic similar to that of the cases presented by Taiwan legal scholar Han-yi Shaw in the New York Times and elsewhere. The Japanese position and argument are presented in detail in Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Islands Dispute: Okinawa's Reversion and the Senkaku Islands (New York: Routledge, 2014), as well as in Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents.

[4] Ma Ying-jeou's detailed interest in East China Sea matters goes back more than thirty years. For a detailed look at sovereignty claims and hydrocarbon resource issues, see his "Trouble Over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundaries and Foreign Investments in the East China Sea," Doctor of Juridical Science Thesis for Harvard Law School, 1980.

[5] For a series of fourteen essays examining the ECSPI and its implications for the East and South China Seas, see Szu-shen Ho and Kuan-hsiung Wang (eds.), A Bridge Over Troubled Waters: Prospects for Peace in the South and East China Seas (Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2014).

[6] An English translation of the Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement appears at the end of this text as Appendix 2.

[7] A detailed account of China-Japan fishing relations and agreements appears in James Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), especially chapter three on fisheries issues.

[8] "Taiwan, Japan Hold Second Round of Fisheries Talks," The China Post, Dec. 6, 2013, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/intl-community/2013/12/06/395293/Taiwan-Japan.htm.

[9] According to an interview in Taipei during July, 2015, some Taiwanese felt before 2012 that the Japanese were "arrogant," "looked down on" the Taiwanese fishermen, and still had a "colonial master mentality." There was a sense that the September 2012 water cannon battle between Taiwanese fishing boats and Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the Diaoyutai area woke up the Japanese, and forced them to take notice that the situation had changed.

[10] "Taiwan, Japan Hold Second Round of Fisheries Talks," Ibid. See the map prepared on April 10, 2013, in "The Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement-Embodying the Ideals of the East Chinas Sea Peace Initiative," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), August, 2013.

[11] "Third Japan-Taiwan Fishery Meeting Starts in Taipei," Taipei Times, Jan. 24, 2014; available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/01/24/2003582027.

[12] "Taiwan and Japan Strike Compromise in Fisheries Talks," Taipei Times, Jan. 26, 2014; available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/01/26/2003582182.

[13] "Taiwan-Japan Agree on Amended Fishing Regulations," The China Post, Mar. 8, 2015; available at

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2015/03/08/430547/Taiwan-and.htm

[14] "Taiwan: The Winner in the China-Japan Row? Dispute Between Two Powers Results in Unexpected Benefits for Tiny Taiwan's Fishing Industry,": Al Jazeera, Feb. 3, 2014; available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/02/taiwan-winner-china-japan-row-20142294639293399.html.

[15] Ibid.

[16] An interview in Taipei, July, 2015, with a Japanese scholar suggests that although Taiwan fisheries negotiators are very happy about the new fishing rules agreed upon by the Japan-Taiwan Fishery Committee last April, there is anger and discontent within Okinawa's fishing communities, leading to the opinion that the 2013 agreement is a success story of President Ma's Peace Initiatives in the East China Sea, but that it is too early to assess the ultimate impact of the TJFA because the issue is deeply rooted to China's sovereignty over Taiwan, as well as to its territorial claim over the Senkaku/Daioyutai Islands. This line of thought led to the proposition that the real test of the TGFA may come after Taiwan's Presidential election in January, 2016. On the other hand, scholars at the National Chengchi University in Taipei and at the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa suggested that the TJFA is a good place to start looking at important links in developing an economic growth triangle between Taiwan, Okinawa, and Kyushu.

[17] Observations in this section rely on an interview with Mr. Shinko Kuniyoshi in Naha on July 27, 2015. Mr. Ryo Irei arranged this appointment, and served as translator for the interview. Mr. Kuniyoshi, former President of the Okinawa Fisheries Cooperatives Association, participated in all four Taiwan-Okinawa Fisheries talks to date, serving as the chief negotiator representing Okinawa's fisheries industry.

[18] Mr. Kuniyoshi provided copies of these two maps used by Japanese representatives during the TJFC negotiations, as well notes on unresolved issues to be discussed in the next negotiation round. Although not explicitly stated during the interview, it appears that "Zone 1 and Zone 2" in the English language news articles correlate with the trapezoidal and triangular map segments shown here in Map 2. In other words, Z1 refers to the trapezoid, and Z2 refers to the triangle.

[19] Comment was made that third grade bluefin tuna is sold locally in the Okinawa market. No comment was made about the distribution location of second grade tuna.

[20] Mr. Kuniyoshi expressed uncertainty about why this area was included in the agreement at all.

[21] An earlier number of 400 Taiwan fishing boats came up in interview, but was corrected.

[22] Data was unavailable on either fishing limits or specific quantities of fish caught. Mr. Kuniyoshi indicated that he had no fishing statistics to convey. The implication was that such statistics are hard to compile and track. If possible, it would be useful to collect ten years of quantity statistics to see if the TJFA has affected overall catch levels by both sides of the agreement.

[23] According to the interview, the Japanese Fish and Agriculture Ministry has advised Japanese boats to limit fishing in the south, and Yaeyama's fish catch has decreased.

[24] Mr. Kuniyoshi said that Chinese boats may fish in Japanese waters, but Taiwanese boats may not. In any event, the implication for Taiwan seems to be that Japan will enforce its no fishing procedures for Taiwan outside of the 74,000sqkm TJFA agreed mutual fishing zone.

[25] Information here is based on an informal field review of these ports on July 31, 2015. Including smaller fishing ports, it is fair to say that the overall Ishigaki fishing fleet might amount to about 200 fishing boats. At the time of field review, five Japan Coast Guard cutters were berthed in the central harbor between Tonoshiro and Ishigaki fishing ports.

[26] A staff member in the Ishigaki City office said that Ishigaki beef is becoming better known in the four main islands of Japan, but that competing with the famous brand name of Kobe beef in central Japan was an uphill battle.

[27] Mr. Masahiro Kanna produced a set of economic statistics comparing tourism and agriculture/fisheries during the interview with him on July 31, 2015.

[28] Based on graphs from Hiroshi Kakazu in email dated Aug. 1, 2015. Graphs have not yet been published.

[29] Interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offices, Taipei.

[30] See "Regulations for Longline Fishing Vessels Operating in the Maritime Area Subject to the Taiwan Japan Fisheries Agreement." promulgated on Mar. 5, 2014, pursuant to the Taiwan Fisheries Act.

[31] Chou-Tien Yao, "The Performance and Perspectives of The Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement," paper delivered at the 2015 East Asian Maritime Peace Forum (Taipei: Grand Hyatt, Aug. 5, 2015), p. 83.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Various Taiwan MOFA and news articles, see for instance, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2C62458194137213&s=97B8486A61EC2693.

[34] "Taiwan-Philippines Sign Fishing Treaty," Taipei Times, Nov. 20, 2015; signatories are the Taipei Economic and Cultural Organization (TECO) and the Manila Economic and Cultural Organization (MECO).

[35] "Meeting Face to Face, Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou Take a Big Leap of Faith Towards Peace," South China Morning Post, Nov. 11, 2015; available at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1877829/meeting-face-

face-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou-take-big-leap.

[36] Beijing-backed Free-trade Plan Fails to Advance at Apec , South China Morning Post, Nov. 20, 2015; available at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1880716/beijing-backed-free-trade-plan-fails-advance-apec.

[37] South China Morning Post, 22 November 2015.

[38] This is an unofficial English translation of the Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement. Official copies of this Agreement have been released only in Chinese and Japanese. A Taiwanese summary of the agreement is contained in "The Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement—Embodying the Ideals and Spirit of the East China Sea Peace Initiative," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), Aug. 2013. A Japanese summary of the agreement appears in "Japan-Taiwan Fishery Arrangement," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2013.

[39] Map provided by Okinawa Fisheries Cooperative, English translation.

[40] Ibid.